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INTRODUCTION

In June of 2007, Timberline High School in Washington State
received a series of bomb threats that prompted a week of evacuations.1
The FBI and local law enforcement traced the purveyor of the threats to
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Gene Johnson, FBI Says It Faked AP Story To Catch Bomb Suspect, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 28, 2014), available at http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-TheNews/2014/AP-Seattle-Times-Upset-About-FBI-Impersonation.
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an anonymous account on the MySpace social media site.2 However, the
trail seemed to stop there, as investigators were unable to ascertain the
identity of the person behind the account.3 So, the FBI resorted to
subterfuge.
According to a letter sent from FBI Director James Comey to the
New York Times, an undercover agent, "[r]elying on an agency
behavioral assessment that the anonymous suspect was a narcissist,...
portrayed himself as an employee of The Associated Press" and sent the
MySpace account a message via MySpace's internal communications
channel.4 In the message, the agent "asked if the suspect would be
willing to review a draft article about the threats," to be sure that the
suspect was portrayed fairly. The message then linked to what seemed
to be the draft Associated Press (AP) story. However, the draft story was
a fake that the FBI designed to mimic the appearance and feel of a
genuine article. Additionally, the link contained a particular kind of
malicious software ("malware"), meant to enable the FBI to
surreptitiously uncover the location and Internet Protocol address of the
computer behind the anonymous MySpace account.6 The suspect agreed
to review the draft article and the trap sprang and shut. The 15-year-old
suspect clicked on the link to the supposed AP article, and thereby
unwittingly downloaded the malware and revealed case-making
investigative information to the FBI. The suspect later pled guilty to
making the bomb threats.'
In early November of 2014, the FBI confirmed that it did indeed
create a fake AP story in order to apprehend its suspect. 9 The revelations
sparked immediate, if unsurprising, controversy. Christopher Soghoian,
the American Civil Liberties Union technologist who revealed the ruse,
took to Twitter to announce his outrage at the irresponsibility of
impersonating a media entity. o Then Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick
2

Id.

3

Id.

Letter from James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the
Editor, New York Times (Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11
/07/opinion/to-catch-a-crook-the-fbis-use-of-deception.html?_r-2&referrer=.
4

5

Id.

6

Id.
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Nate Anderson, FBI Uses Spyware To Bust Bomb Threat Hoaxster, ARs TECHNICA
(Jul. 18, 2007), available at http://arstechnica.com/security/2007/07/fbi-uses-virus-tobust-bomb-threat-hoaxster/.
8

9

Id.

to Lily Hay Newman, The FBI Used Malware and a Fake Seattle Times Article Page
to Track a Bomb Threat Suspect, SLATE, (Oct. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.slate.com/blogs/futuretense/2014/10/28/thefbi made a malware
spreading seattle times article to track bomb threat.html.
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Leahy sent a letter to then Attorney General Eric Holder, expressing his
"increasing[] concern" that federal law enforcement agencies appropriate
the identities of others without their knowledge or consent and further
urged the Justice Department to reevaluate its policies on this tactic."
Leahy's letter also pointed out that such a tactic carries "ethical and legal
risks" as it "raises questions of copyright and trademark infringement"
and "independent press."1 2 The AP claimed the "ploy violated AP's
name and undermined AP's credibility." 3 Moreover, AP's general
counsel sent a letter to Attorney General Holder, "protest[ing] in the
strongest possible terms the FBI's fabrication and publication of a fake
Associated Press news story" and arguing that such a tactic "raises
serious constitutional concerns" as it undermines the independence of a
free press.14
The AP, and the many other media and press organizations 5 that
voiced their concern in the aftermath of the FBI's revelations, are
understandably upset and vocal. But going beyond the noise, what rules
apply to this novel instance of cyber-subterfuge? With the proliferation
of both foreign and domestic national security threats, law enforcement
authorities have resorted to new investigative techniques to meet this
new generation of danger. However, tied to the increase in the
complexity and novelty of these new techniques is the opacity of the
legal propriety surrounding their use. This article will take the justdeclassified FBI investigation of Timberline High School as a case study
and examine the legality of this new form of law enforcement deception:
the misappropriation of press and media entities in the course of a law
enforcement investigation. Under relevant existing legal constraints, this
article concludes that given the increasingly legalized environment of an
already hyper-legalized field-national security-the ability of law
it

Letter from Patrick J. Leahy, Senator and Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, to
Eric Holder, Attorney General (October 30, 2014), available at http://images.
politico.com/global/2014/10/31/10-30-14_leahy toholder-re_-_fbi-fake-ap
article.html.
12
Id.
13
Ellen Nakashima and Paul Farhi, FBI Lured Suspect with Fake Web Page, But May
Have Leveraged Media Credibility, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-lured-suspect-with-fakeweb-page-but-may-have-leveraged-media-credibility/2014/10/28/e6a9ac94-5ed0-11 e491f7-5d89b5e8c25 _story.html.
14
Letter from Karen Kaiser, General Counsel of The Associated Press, to Eric Holder,
Attorney General (Oct. 30, 2014) (hereinafter "AP"), available at https://corpcommap.
files.wordpress.com/2014/10/letter_103014.pdf.
15
See e.g., Email from The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et. al, to
Eric H. Holder, Attorney General of the United States, and James B. Comey, Director of
the FBI (Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/2014-11-06letter-to-doj-fbi-regarding-se.pdf.
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enforcement to engage in an investigative tactic like the one used in
Timberline is likely sharply circumscribed under existing internal
guidelines even if such a tactic is marginally "legal" as a statutory or
constitutional matter.
In Part II, this article will analyze the Timberline investigation on the
basis of relevant internal guidance. Specifically, Part II will evaluate the
Timberline episode on the basis of the Attorney General's Guidelines on
FBI Undercover Operations and the Online Investigative Principles for
Federal Law Enforcement Agents. In Part III, this article will analyze the
Timberline episode under federal trademark law. In Part IV, the article
will examine three grounds on which the FBI's actions in Timberline
may have implicated the First Amendment. Specifically, Part IV will
analyze whether the FBI's actions interfered with the First Amendment
right to the dissemination of information; whether the FBI's actions were
constitutionally problematic under the compelled speech framework; and
whether the FBI's actions chilled or diluted the speech of the AP to the
extent that it amounted to a constitutional violation. Finally, Part V will
conclude with some thoughts and observations.

II.

THE FBI's INTERNAL GUIDANCE AND CONTROLS

Obviously, the FBI's own internal policies are relevant to the
Timberline episode; FBI Director Comey made that much clear in his
missive to the New York Times.1 6 By dint of 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510 and
533, Congress has delegated considerable power to the Attorney
General-who in turn has issued important guidance to investigators
within the FBI, namely, the Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI
Undercover Operations (the "Guidelines") updated in 2013.'1
Additionally, there exists the Online Investigative Principles for Federal
Law Enforcement Agents (the "Principles"), which was drafted in 1999
under the auspices of an interagency working group convened by the
Justice Department.' 8

16
17

Comey, supra note 4.
John Ashcroft, U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, The Attorney General's Guidelines on
Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations (2013) (hereinafter the
"Guidelines"), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/09
/24/undercover-fbi-operations.pdf.
18
Online Investigative Principles for Federal Law Enforcement Agents (U.S. Dep't of
Justice,
1999)
(hereinafter
the
"Principles"),
available
at
https://
info.publicintelligence.net/DoJ-Onlinelnvestigations.pdf.
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A.
The Attorney General's Guidelineson FBI Undercover
Operations

'

The Guidelines spell out steps and procedures the FBI must follow in
order to engage in "undercover activities and undercover operations."' 9
Significantly, the Guidelines define "undercover activities" as "any
investigative activity involving the use of an assumed name or cover
identity by an employee of the FBI." "Undercover operation" in turn
means "an investigation involving a series of related undercover
activities over a period of time by an undercover employee." 2 0 The
Guidelines are a plausible-if not obviously clear-fit, given that an FBI
agent assumed the name or cover identity of an AP reporter in order to
undertake such a scheme. Moreover, the sole exception to the
applicability of the Guidelines is "[an] investigation[] utilizing
confidential informants . . . ," which is not relevant to the Timberline
investigation. 2
Under Section IV.A of the Guidelines then, the FBI is required to
examine and evaluate any undercover investigation in light of the
following general approval standards:
[1] The risk of personal injury to individuals, property
damage, financial loss to persons or businesses, damage
to reputation, or other harm to persons;
[2] The risk of civil liability or other loss to the
Government;
[3] The risk of invasion of privacy or interference with
privileged or confidential relationships and any potential
constitutional concerns or other legal concerns;
[4] The risk that individuals engaged in undercover
operations may become involved in illegal conduct; and
[5] The suitability of Government participation in the
type of activity that is expected to occur during the
22
operation.
Authorization by the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) constitutes
approval of the investigation.23 Given that the SAC must, "weigh the
19
20
21
22
23

Guidelines, supra note 17, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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risks and benefits of the operation," and ensure that the "[i]nitiation of
investigative activity . .. is warranted under any applicable departmental
guidelines," 2 4-which,
as explained above, should include the
Guidelines- the fact that the Timberline investigation occurred means
that the SAC believed that none of the above standards precluded an
investigation that involved the misappropriation of a press identity. In
other words, the SAC authorization of the Timberline investigation
means that the SAC did not believe that any of the "risks" presented in
the general approval standards listed above outweighed the benefits of
the operation. As Director Comey stated in his letter to the New York
Times, the Timberline investigation "was proper and appropriate under
Justice Department and F.B.I. guidelines at the time." 25
There is good reason to doubt whether such a tactic would be
appropriate today under the Guidelines. As a preliminary matter, the AP
in its letter to Attorney General Holder complained that at least four of
the five standards are implicated when law enforcement misappropriates
its identity.2 6 With the increasing concern over the propriety of certain
investigative or law enforcement actions,27 the "risks" referred to in the
general approval standards have likely all increased, affecting the
balance to the extent that perhaps only the most paramount of law
enforcement interests would permit the use of such a tactic today.
Additionally,
Director
Comey
implicitly
admitted
the
inappropriateness of using the tactic in a Timberline-like situation today.
In his letter to the New York Times, he stated in relevant part that the
"technique was proper and appropriateunder Justice Department and
F.B.I. guidelines at the time. Today, the use of such an unusual technique
would probably require higher level approvals than in 2007, but it would
still be lawful and, in a rare case, appropriate."28 This particular part of
the letter is telling for two reasons. First, Comey notes that while the
Timberline investigation was legal "at the time," the use of such a
technique today would be subject to more stringent review.29 Second,
Comey seems to have drawn a contrast between what is "proper and
appropriate" and what is merely "lawful," with the former likely
referring to the FBI Undercover Guidelines and the DOJ Principles, and
24

Id.
Comey, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
26
See AP, supra note 14.
27
See generally Clay Calvert, The FirstAmendment Right to Record Images ofPolice
in Public Places: The Unreasonable Slipperiness of Reasonableness & Possible Paths
Forward, 3 TEX. A&M L. REv. 131 (2015) (chronicling instances and concerns of police
misconduct).
28
Comey, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
29
Id.
25

2015-16]

STEALING PRESS CREDENTIALS

31

the latter referring to broader guidance like statutes or the Constitution.
This distinction is important because Comey has apparently conceded the
inappropriateness of such an investigation today. In the first sentence,
Comey explains that the technique was both "proper and appropriate"
under FBI and DOJ guidelines in 2007.30 However, in the last sentence,
Comey admits only the lawfulness of the technique and explains that
only in rare cases will the technique also be appropriate.3 ' As a result,
Director Comey seems to suggest that using the tactic in a Timberlinelike situation today would likely be inappropriate in most circumstances.
Moreover, Comey refers to the tactic as an "unusual technique" and
explains that the tactic is only appropriate in a "rare case." 3 2 All of this
further counsels for the conclusion that the use of the tactic under now
existing guidelines is sharply circumscribed if not totally inappropriate.
Additionally, other parts of the Guidelines seem to suggest additional
prudence is called for when impersonating a member of the news media,
further giving reason to doubt the propriety of the tactic should it be used
today. Under Section C, the Guidelines outline numerous situations
where approval at FBI Headquarters (Headquarters), in addition to SAC
approval, is required.33 One of these situations is an investigation that
presents one or more "sensitive circumstances." 3 4 As a result, should a
sensitive circumstance be present in a potential FBI undercover
investigation, the application must be forwarded to Headquarters where
both the Undercover Review Committee and the FBI Director or a
designated Assistant Director must approve the application.3 5
The Guidelines lists a number of sensitive circumstances, but
perhaps the most applicable are (c), (j), and (o).36 Under circumstance
(c), "an [FBI] investigation of possible criminal conduct by any . . news
media" is a sensitive circumstance that would require Headquarters
approval.3 7 Though the FBI did not investigate the AP, it seems plausible
that the reasons behind the adoption of circumstance (c) would also
apply in this case. The likely reason for why circumstance (c), an
investigation of the press, is a sensitive circumstance is because the press
has a special relationship to the public and an often adversarial
relationship to the government.38 As articulated in both case law and the
30
31
32

33

34
35
36
37
38

Id.

Id.
Id.
Guidelines, supra note 17, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.

Id. at 6-8.
Id.

See infra Section IV.
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AP letter, independence of the press has been a crucial cornerstone of
free society, with the press often serving as a watchdog over the
39**
government. Thus, it is no surprise that government activities that may
affect or undermine press independence are sensitive circumstances.
Obviously, a government controlled investigation of the press has the
potential to undermine the press' independence, but misappropriating a
media identity should also invoke this concern. Given the potential for
public confusion over whether the news they read was written by an
independent press or is mere government propaganda, the Government
does not need to investigate the press in order to undermine its
independence.
Circumstance (j) is even more relevant than (c). Under (j), a special
circumstance exists when there is a "significant risk that a third party will
enter into a professional or confidential relationship with a person
participating in an undercover operation who is acting as ... [a] member
of the news media." 4 0 That situation clearly occurred in this case when an
undercover agent impersonated a member of the news media. Whether or
not the Timberline suspect entered or attempted to enter into a
confidential relationship with the undercover agent is unclear, but the
presence of the circumstance indicates the general concern around
impersonating media entities and the delicate nature of undercover
operations when there is the potential for setting up confidential
relationships.
Finally, circumstance (o) seems, as a textual matter, clearly
applicable. Under (o), a special circumstance exists when "persons
participating
in
the
undercover
operation"
make
"untrue
representation ... concerning the activities or involvement of any third
person without that individual's knowledge or consent." 4 ' The
undercover agent participating in the Timberline operation made untrue
representations about the activities and involvement of the AP, without
the AP's knowledge or consent, when the agent informed the suspect that
the AP was seeking to publish an article about him.
It is unclear whether in the actual Timberline investigation, this or
any other sensitive circumstances were found, and thus it is unclear
whether the investigation was authorized merely by the SAC, or also by
Headquarters.4 2 But regardless of whether any sensitive circumstances
were literally implicated, the presence of these three sensitive
circumstances demonstrates the controversial nature of undercover work,
39

Id.

Guidelines, supranote 17, at 7.
Id. at 8.
42
Given the above analysis, it seems likely that the tactic should have been reviewed
at FBIHQ, although the disclosed documents do not reveal whether this in fact happened.
40
41

2015-16]

33

STEALING PRESS CREDENTIALS

especially when it comes to undercover activities that relate to the press
and that take place without their knowledge or consent. Given the outcry
over the revelation of the Timberline episode-which is in reality an
extraordinarily "low-grade" and "contained"
example of law
enforcement misappropriation of a press identity 4 3-and
Director
Comey's tacit acknowledgement that the use of such a tactic would not
be appropriate in a Timberline-like situation today, it would be no
surprise if there are few scenarios that would call for the usage of such a
technique under today's more stringent interpretation of the Guidelines.
B.
The Online Investigative Principlesfor FederalLaw
Enforcement Agents
Drafted in 1999 under the auspices of an interagency working group
convened by the Justice Department, the Principles are meant to ensure
that law enforcement agents "know the rules" regarding various
investigative tactics in the cyber-era. Though not technically binding,45
they do "state the basic rule for each major category of investigative
activity"46 and thus may nonetheless be an important legal authority
within the FBI. Of the Principles, the most relevant to the Timberline
investigation are Principles 6 ("Undercover Communications"), 7
("Online Undercover Facilities"), and 9 ("Appropriating Online
Identity").4 7
Under Principle 6, "[a]gents may communicate online [with a
subject] under a non-identifying name or fictitious identity if agency
guidelines and procedures would authorize such communications in the
physical world." 48 The FBI is clearly authorized to operate undercover in
the physical world. 49 Additionally, Principle 6 allows agents "to make
pretext calls or other preliminary contacts without going through an
elaborate approval process."5 0 Principle 6 provides an example of such a
"pretext call":

Relatively, the Timberline episode was both a low-grade and contained use of
deception. "Contained" and "low-grade" are used to mean that in the Timberline episode,
no person other than the suspect saw the draft AP article, there was no distribution of the
article, and no harm was actually done. As a result, the usage of the tactic in Timberline
was very controlled.
4
Principles, supranote 18, at 2.
45
Id. at 1, n. 1.
46
Id. at viii.
43

47
48

Id. at 27, 34, 44.
Id. at 33.

See e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966)
constitutionality of undercover deception by law enforcement officials).
50
Principles, supranote 18, at 36.
49

(upholding

the
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An agent is seeking information about an attack on a
computer system. She proposes to inquire about the
attack, without disclosing her affiliation with law
enforcement, in a chat room frequented by the suspected
computer hackers. If the agency would consider such a
communication to be an undercover contact had it
occurred in person or over the telephone, it should be
considered an undercover contact online, subject to the
same procedures and constraints . . . . The agent in [this
example] is permitted by her agency guidelines to make
the isolated inquiry without seeking approval for an
undercover operation. One of the participants in the chat
room states that he has information, and a conversation
ensues ... .Depending on the agency's undercover
guidelines and the sensitivity of the operation, the agent
may need to obtain approvals under the agency
guidelines before engaging in further undercover
communications on this matter.
Although the above example does not map perfectly on to the
Timberline case, it is clearly illustrative. On the one hand, the FBI
identified an online account and then engaged in communication with the
person behind the account, thereby leading to the suspect's identification.
On the other, and unlike the example provided above of an undercover
agent merely "inquir[ing]" about a cyber-attack, the Timberline
communication did not comprise of an inquiry for general information
conveyed within a quasi-public forum (a chat room), but instead a
targeted search for specific information conveyed to the target directly at
a virtual location occupied by him only (his Myspace account). What's
more, the FBI's missive did not have a true communicative purpose at
all; the message instead was merely the vehicle by which malware was
delivered.52
Principle 7 explains that "[j]ust as law enforcement agencies may
establish physical-world undercover entities; they also may establish
online undercover facilities, such as bulletin board systems, Internet
service providers, and World Wide Web sites, which covertly offer

Id. at 40-41.
See Memorandum from the Operational Technology Division, FBI, to Cyber
Division, FBI Seattle Field Office (July 5, 2007) (on file with the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, pg.27 of document available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode
/cipav/fbicipav-08.pdf) (hereinafter "CIPAV Memo") (noting that the "objective" of
operation was the deployment of the malware, aka CIPAV).
51

52
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information or services to the public."
example:

53

35

The principle provides an

As part of a project to identify and prosecute computer
criminals, a law enforcement agency considers a
proposal to operate a World Wide Web site with
information about and computer programs for hacking,
links to other hacker sites, and a facility to allow people
who access the site to discuss hacking techniques. The
proposal would allow the law enforcement agents
running the site to track all visitors, and monitor all
54
communications among the users.
Principle 7, however, goes on to warn that online undercover
facilities "can raise novel and complex legal issues . . . involving privacy,
international sovereignty, and unintended harm to unknown third
parties."5 5 Moreover, "[a]gencies must be sensitive to the profound
public policy implications that can be raised by online undercover
facilities. Imprudent or undisciplined use of such facilities by any agency
will surely lead to public distrust of law enforcement's online work in
general." 56

It is unclear whether in the Timberline investigation the FBI created
a fake AP website in addition to a fake draft article.
But the
admonishments of Principle 7 to be sensitive to the incidental harms
inflicted on third parties and other public policy considerations is
prescient, especially given the AP's and the general public's eventual
reaction to the method used to snare the Timberline suspect. There exists
a current wave of public distrust of intelligence and investigative tactics,
and perhaps more generally of the conduct of law enforcement and the
intelligence community.58 Given that the FBI must be sensitive to this, it
is likely that more and more tactics that involve the misappropriation of
identities will be regarded as an "imprudent" choice to be toned down or
phased out. Indeed, like the weighing process under the FBI Guidelines,
Id. at 42.
Id.
5
Id.
56
Id. at 46.
5
Compare Mike Carter, FBI Created Fake Seattle Times Web Page To Nab BombThreat Suspect, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 27, 2014, available at http://www.seattletimes.com
/seattle-news/fbi-created-fake-seattle-times-web-page-to-nab-bomb-threat-suspect/
(noting that the FBI created a fake web page in addition to a fake news article), with
CIPAV Memo, supra note 52, at 61 (mentioning only the deployment of a fake news
article).
58
Calvert, supra note 27.
53

54
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the balance may have fundamentally shifted so that such a tactic may no
longer be appropriate, even if it is still marginally legal. 59
Finally, the big-ticket issue here is not simply that the FBI created a
fake online website (Principle 7) or employed a non-identifying name or
fictitious identity (Principle 6), but that the FBI impersonated existing
entities: the Associated Press and perhaps one of its reporters. Principle 9
discusses the misappropriation of an online identity, which occurs when
"a law enforcement agent electronically communicates with others by
deliberately assuming the known online identity (such as the username)
of a real person, without obtaining that person's consent." 60
A potential wrinkle is that the AP, a private company, is a corporate
person rather than a physical one, and thus may or may not be within
Principle 9's coverage as a literal matter. 6 ' Either way, the spirit of
Principle 9, when considered in conjunction with Principles 6 and 7, very
much seems to be implicated by the impersonation of the AP qua
organization. Principle 9 declares that misappropriation of identity is "an
intrusive law enforcement technique" that may "raise significant legal
problems" and as such, "[t]he technique should be confined only to
investigations of serious criminal cases, and should be used in those
investigations as narrowly as possible." 6 2 It further outlines procedures
the Justice Department must follow if it seeks to undertake such an
action. For instance, an agent involved in the investigation "must,
whenever possible, seek the concurrence of the United States Attorney's
Office's Computer and Telecommunications Coordinator (CTC) in the
District where the investigation is taking place."63 But unlike any other
principle, and perhaps reflective of the uniquely "important concerns
raised" by misappropriating an existing identity, Principle 9 further
directs that the CTC must in turn "notify the appropriate supervisor in the
U.S. Attorney's Office when they are consulted under this Principle." 6 4
Principle 9 makes it clear that impersonating any real entity is
delicate matter, and that any investigation using this tactic must be
closely monitored, scrutinized, and circumscribed. But there is good
reason why the dictates of Principle 9 are at their pinnacle when law
enforcement impersonates a press entity. For one, the AP is a high-

See infra Part IV.
Principles, supra note 18, at 54.
61
This particular wrinkle may be immaterial if the undercover agent in Timberline
actually impersonated a specific AP reporter or writer. But neither the disclosed
documents nor Comey's letter reports this.
62
Principles, supra note 18, at 54.
63
See Id. at 57 (noting Principle 7, which addresses the establishing of an online
undercover facility, has a similar requirement); also see Id. at 43
59

60

64

Id. at 57.
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profile outfit. Just as misappropriating the identity of a well-known
human being (a senator or a general) would likely pose more concerns
than misappropriating the identity of a low-ranking drug dealer, the
status of the AP means that there is an especially present "threat [of]
damage to their reputations" and "[t]he damage caused may be both
long-lasting and widespread." 65
Moreover, the first general approval standard under the FBI
Guidelines-which states that the FBI must evaluate "the risk of personal
injury to individuals, property damage, financial loss to persons or
businesses, damage to reputation, or other harm" when undertaking an
investigation-is particularly relevant when the media's identity is
misappropriated.66 Like all media organizations, the AP's currency is its
reputation for being a reporter of facts, a disseminator of news, instead of
falsities. Therefore, government actions that directly damage that
reputation, which the AP warned of in its letter to the FBI, seem
particularly inappropriate under this general approval standard. 67 As a
result, there is good reason to believe that such a tactic, if used against a
member of the institutional press or mass media, may be inappropriate.
This is especially true given that Principle 7, as explained above, warns
of "profound public policy implications that can be raised by online
undercover facilities" and that improper use of such facilities will "surely
lead to public distrust of law enforcement's online work in general." 68
Misappropriating the identity of a leading media organization would
seem to present just that possibility.
Given the considerations and framework presented by both the FBI
Guidelines and the DOJ Principles, it may well be the case that even if
the law enforcement tactic of misappropriating the identity of a press
organization is legal, 69 it may nonetheless never be appropriate under
now existing guidance. Both the Guidelines and Principles note the
Id. at 55; see also Guidelines, supra note 17, at 3.
Guidelines, supra note 17, at 3.
67
There is a concern, perhaps existential, that the "damage to reputation" prong is
nonexistent if a ruse like that used in the Timberline investigation remains under wraps.
In other words, from the FBI's perspective, it is at least arguable that the most
theoretically reputation-damaging undercover activities could be undertaken if the
Bureau takes adequate precautions to prevent the activities from becoming public
knowledge. But this interpretation appears dubious. It is doubtful that Guideline 1, when
it directs the FBI to "examine" the "damage to [the] reputation" of a person, is really
directing the FBI to examine how well it can keep damaging stuff secret. For one, such an
interpretation would obviate the need for any Guidelines or safeguards; risk to reputation
would be zero in every case where the FBI believed it could achieve total secrecy. That
moreover, would seemingly run counter to a key purpose behind the Guidelines: to
"carefully consider[] and monitor[]" undercover activities. Guidelines, supra note 17 at 1.
68
Principles, supra note 18, at 46.
69
See infra Part IV.
65
66
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paramount concerns that come with misappropriating the identity of third
parties without their knowledge or permission. Because the press
occupies a particularly sensitive and unique role in American society and
democracy, the "risks" involved in misappropriating their identity, or the
identity of any news organization, may present an unacceptable burden.
With the ever-increasing cognizance and wariness of law enforcement
and intelligence misconduct, and the general distrust of law enforcement
and intelligence authorities as a whole, the FBI, and law enforcement
authorities generally, may do well to avoid misappropriating the
identities of the press in the future.

III.

TRADEMARK

Senator Leahy's letter claimed copyright law as a possible ground
for the illegality of the FBI's actions. 70 This section analyzes the
applicability of federal trademark law and determines that the Lanham
Act (the "Act") is not applicable.
The Lanham Act, the primary federal trademark statutes, provides
two causes of action72 to owners of trademarks against "any person" who
uses the trademark without the owner's permission.7 3 Under the Act, a
cause of action exists when a person shall:
1) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy,
or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive;
2) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a
registered mark and apply such reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs,
prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
70

Leahy, supra note 11.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051- 1127 (2012).
72
There are two additional causes of action for dilution by blurring and dilution by
tarnishment. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). Neither of these two causes of action are
relevant given that they require similarity between a famous mark and the mark in
question. That is not at issue here as the FBI did not create a similar mark to the AP's,
rather, the FBI misappropriated the AP's mark.
73
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012).
71
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advertising of goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive.74
The good news for the AP is that as defined in the Act, "any person"
does "include the United States, [and] all agencies and instrumentalities
thereof,"7 5 and thus the FBI may be a defendant in a trademark suit.
76
Moreover, the FBI cannot claim sovereign immunity. However, there
are a number of other issues that likely preclude the application of the
Act.
First, the FBI must have used in "commerce" or intended to use in
"commerce" the counterfeited or reproduced mark.
Although the Act
defines commerce broadly as "all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress,"78 even under a broad reading of the Commerce
Clause, it would be difficult to characterize the FBI's actions in
Timberline as commerce. The FBI's actions were not a "use of channels
of interstate commerce," nor were they "instrumentalities of interstate
commerce."79 As a result, the only way that the FBI's actions could be
interpreted as commerce is if their actions substantially affected
commerce, 0 but this seems unlikely. The misappropriation of AP's mark
was a single isolated instance and it is unfathomable to think that any law
enforcement agency would misappropriate identities to the extent that it
would substantially affect commerce.8 Though it is conceivable that if
the topic of a fake news article was on an economically salient issue and
the article was released to the public, that the article may generate
widespread public confusion and thereby lead to substantial economic
effects, it seems unlikely the FBI would be so reckless as to do so.
Second, even if somehow the trademark was regarded as being used
in commerce, the FBI's actions would still have to be "in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services."82 Clearly, the FBI's actions were not in connection with the

Id. at (a)-(b).
Id. at (1)(b).
15 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012).

74
7
76
77
78

79
so

15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1).

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
Id.

st Moreover, the actual act of writing a fake article would likely not count as economic
activity if not done for profit, thus, the AP would not be able to aggregate the effects of
all instances of identity misappropriation. See e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 600 (holding
that activities that are not commercial or economic in nature cannot be aggregated for
purposes of the "substantially affects" test).
82
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)-(b).
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sale, offering for sale, or advertising of goods or services. As for
distribution, though the point of newspapers and the press is to distribute
information, the tactic that the FBI used was meant to trick the suspect
and was not in connection with the distribution of any goods or services.
Indeed, it would seem the FBI has a pressing interest against any sort of
distribution as the leakage of any false news articles to the general public
would be a cause of concern.83 As a result, it is very unlikely that the
Lanham Act is applicable to the FBI's actions should a Timberline-like
episode occur again.

IV.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Finally, the First Amendment may be implicated. Though Senator
Leahy, the AP, and notable others have suggested the possibility of a
constitutional violation, it is perhaps noteworthy that they have not
identified specific First Amendment grounds for why the FBI's actions
were unconstitutional. 84 Indeed, in their letters, there is strikingly little
analysis on how such law enforcement actions would amount to a First
Amendment violation. This is in fact not surprising since there is little
literature on the First Amendment in the context of identity
misappropriation. This section explores three possible grounds on which
the First Amendment may apply, and preclude, what the FBI did in
Timberline.

A. Independence of the Press
Both Senator Leahy and the AP in their respective letters to Attorney
General Holder suggested that the FBI's actions implicated the
independence of the press." This section will first explore what it means
for the press to be independent and then analyze whether the FBI's
actions interfered with the independence of the press on two fronts: first,
whether the freedom of dissemination has been affected; and two,
whether the compelled speech framework applies. Although it is difficult
to characterize the FBI's actions as being in violation of the First
Amendment in both these instances, an expansive reading of these
frameworks may allow for the First Amendment's applicability.

83
Principles, supra note 18, at 54 (noting that appropriation of online identity should
only be used in limited circumstances).
84 See Reporters Committee E-Mail, supra note 15.
85
See generally, Kaiser, supra note 14 and Leahy, supra note 11.
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1. The Freedom of Dissemination
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." 8 6 The freedoms of speech and the press8 7 have
generally been understood to mean that the government cannot control
what speakers say or what the press publishes. As such, the right of
independence of the press is in essence the freedom of the press from
"government in decisions about whether and what to publish."8 9
From this premise, a long line of case law has developed regarding
what kinds of government actions interfere with this right of publication.
For instance, the jurisprudence on prior restraint deals with government
interference on whether and what to publish. However, these prototypical
examples of how the government can undermine the independence of the
press are not directly relevant to the case at hand. At issue is the fact that
the FBI used the AP's name without its permission and subsequently
tricked a reader into thinking that a phony AP article was in fact
published by the AP. The FBI in no way prevented the AP from
publishing, or decided for the AP when and what to publish. As such,
most of the existing case law dealing with the independence of the press
is inapposite.
Given the difficulty of fitting the actions of the FBI into the existing
framework, a broader view of the term "independence" is needed if the
argument that the FBI violated the First Amendment is to succeed. The
typical syllogism is as follows: just like in the Sixth Amendment context
86

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

As a general matter, the Supreme Court has treated the freedom of speech and the
freedom of the press as coextensive. Though some justices have suggested that because
"the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom of speech and freedom of the press,"
the Constitution "requires sensitivity . . . to the special needs of the press in performing it
effectively," Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring), most
cases hold that the press is not entitled to special or deferential treatment that ordinary
speakers would not receive. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670
(1991) (holding that newspapers have "no special immunity from the application of
general laws" and that "enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject
to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against others persons or
organizations"); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) ("the purpose of the
Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all
persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it.").
88
See e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. 622, 653 (1994) (stating that "The First
Amendment protects the editorial independence of the press.").
89
Randall P. Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension Between
Exemption and Independence in Newsgathering by the Press, 47 EMORY L.J. 895, 896
(1998).
87
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where the Supreme Court has interpreted the right to assistance of
counsel as the right to effective assistance of counsel, 90 independence of
the press is not limited to only independence from direct government
control. Such a result makes sense as the government could easily skirt
First Amendment publication protections by interfering with other stages
of the publishing process. As such, the Court has generally recognized
First Amendment protections that go beyond the immediate scope of the
decision of what and when to publish.
For instance, in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court held that "news
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections" because
"without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated." 9' As Justice Stewart's dissent more clearly
explained, the right to publish must also entail the right to gather news,
for without extending the First Amendment to news gathering, the right
to publish may be compromised. 9 2 The logical conclusion of Branzburg
is obvious; if the gathering of information for the purposes of speech or
press is afforded First Amendment protections, then so too must the
dissemination of speech and press. Indeed, the Court has held as such,
ruling in Lovell v. City of Griffin, that the First Amendment protects
dissemination as much as it protects publication. 93 As a result, the First
Amendment right for the press to publish must be effective, and it is
given effectiveness by extending the protection to the collection of
information necessary for publication, and allowing the published
materials to be distributed or disseminated without government
interference.9 4

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
92
Id. at 727-78 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("A corollary of the right to publish must be
the right to gather news. The full flow of information to the public protected by the freepress guarantee would be severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to
the process by which news is assembled . .. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its
source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be
impermissibly compromised.").
93
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (striking down an ordinance
which prohibited the distribution of circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any
kind without a permit because even though the ordinance relates to distribution and not to
publication, "[1]iberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as liberty of
publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.").
94
To be clear, when I use the term "effective," I do not mean to suggest that the
government is under a positive obligation to support speech or publication. The First
Amendment has typically been understood as a mostly negative right. See Monica Youn,
The ChillingEffect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REv. 1473 (2013).
Rather, I simply mean that First Amendment protections must be effective, and it
becomes effective by applying to all stages of the publication process.
90
91
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Thus, on the grounds of a First Amendment right to dissemination,
an argument can be formulated that the FBI's actions amounted to
interference. However, first among these difficulties is that just like the
FBI did not directly interfere with the publication process of the AP, the
FBI also did not directly interfere with the distribution of AP's articles.
Unlike in Lovell, where a city ordinance intentionally and directly
prohibited the distribution of flyers, circulars, and other materials, the
FBI's actions did not affect the dissemination of the AP's articles.
Consider an orator delivering a speech. The fact that an audience
member talks during the speech may interfere with the audience's ability
to hear, and thereby receive, the speech, but it does not interfere with the
actual ability of the orator to disseminate his message. The AP could still
publish its articles and disseminate them as they did before.
Now, the mass distribution of fake articles that physically displace
genuine articles may interfere with distribution. For example, if the FBI
had created a mass of fake New York Times newspapers, and distributed
them by placing the fake papers over genuine New York Times papers in
stores and vending machines, then the physical act of covering up the
genuine papers with the fake papers could be interpreted as interfering
with dissemination. In the cyber realm, if the FBI had created and
distributed so many fake AP articles that when, for example, a user
googles "AP articles," the first hundred results are for fake articles
because the genuine articles have been pushed lower on the search
results page, then that may also count as interference.
But it would be difficult to imagine a world where the FBI would
engage in such widespread behavior. Given how the FBI's internal
guidelines would almost certainly preclude the mass misappropriation of
the press's identity, it would be difficult to imagine this particular
constitutional issue from ever becoming relevant. A single isolated
incident of identity misappropriation, like the Timberline episode, would
not affect the ability of the AP to distribute and reach its listeners.

2. Compelled Speech
Beginning in West Virginia State Board ofEducation v. Barnette, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that the freedom of speech and
press includes the freedom to not speak or publish. 95 Hence, as a general
matter, policies that compel speech are scrutinized the same way as

95

West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see also Riley v.

Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) ("the First
Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision
of both what to say and what not to say.").
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policies that prohibit speech. 9 6 Compelled speech cases have arisen in
instances where the government directly compelled a private actor to
deliver a government message the actor would not have otherwise
delivered. For instance, at issue in Barnette was the compulsory
recitation of the pledge of allegiance and salute of the flag.9 7 Likewise, at
issue in Wooley v. Maynard was a New Hampshire law that mandated
the "Live Free or Die" motto on every New Hampshire vehicle license
plate. 98
The compelled speech framework, however, has expanded to
included instances where a government policy would force a speaker to
accommodate, 99 support'0 0 , or deliver any message'o' that is not the
speaker's own, even if the message is not a government message. An
example of such a "compelled access" case is Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, where the Supreme Court invalidated a "right-of-reply
statute" that required any newspaper that published a piece critical of a
political candidate to make room for a reply from the criticized
candidate.1 02 The grounds for applying the traditional compelled speech
doctrine to compelled access cases are that compelling access necessarily
means controlling, to a degree, what a speaker says. Hence, in Tornillo,
the Court struck down the right-of-reply statute on the grounds that the
statute necessarily compelled newspapers to print the speech of others.' 03
Although these are the grounds on which compelled access statutes are
analyzed on, the examination of additional compelled access cases
demonstrates that these cases can be analyzed under a new framework.
As articulated above, the right of speech and press must effectively
protect speech and press. Given how the Supreme Court has held that the
right to speak necessarily also means the right to not speak, then the First
Amendment must also effectively protect purposeful silence.1 04 Thus, an
alternative reason for why compelled access cases offend the First
Amendment is that compelling an actor to deliver, accommodate, or
support another speaker jeopardizes the actor's right to effective silence.
As a result, central to the inquiry over whether the right to silence has
96

Id. at 796. With the possible exception of commercial speech, which is not at issue

here.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625-26.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
99
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
100 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
101
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
102
Id. at 258.
103
Id. at 254-58.
104
See e.g., Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-97 ("the First Amendment guarantees 'freedom of
speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to
say.").
97

98
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been implicated is the extent to which the public attributes the compelled
access speech to the compelled actor's own decision to speak. In other
words, to analyze whether the First Amendment right to not speak has
been violated, there must be an examination of public confusion.
For instance, in PruneYard Shopping Center. v. Robins, a private

shopping center challenged the California Supreme Court's decision that
it could not exclude from its private property a group of high school
students from passing out pamphlets that were critical of a U.N.
resolution. 05 Pruneyard argued, among other things, that to force it to
accommodate these speakers would be an instance of compelled access,
which would be inconsistent with Wooley, Barnette, and Tornillo.106 In
other words, Pruneyard's argument was that because the freedom of
speech includes the freedom to refrain from speaking, allowing these
pamphleteers to speak while on Pruneyard's private property would risk
the public viewing that Pruneyard was in agreement with the
pamphleteers, that is to say, that Pruneyard was in fact speaking. In
rejecting the shopping center's challenge, the Supreme Court noted that
the views expressed by the pamphleteers "[would] not likely be
identified with those of the owner." 0 7 Although the Supreme Court
stopped short of recognizing a violation of the First Amendment, it
implicitly lent support to the view that if the public truly thought that
Pruneyard agreed with the pamphleteers-thus thinking that Pruneyard
had spoken when it had not-then forcing Pruneyard to allow the
pampleteers access to its grounds may violate Pruneyard's right to not
speak.
A variation of this logic is present in Turner Broadcasting System,

Inc. v. F.C.C., where cable TV operators challenged a provision that
required them to carry local stations.! In rejecting the operators'
compelled access challenge, the Court held that because "there appears
little risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations
carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the
cable operator," the cable operators would not be "forced [] to alter their
own messages to respond to the broadcast programming they are
required to carry."' 09 Implicit in this case is not only the same concern
demonstrated in Pruneyard, but also the subsequent concern of the
actions that the compelled actor must take in order to clarify the now
unclear messages being sent to the public by the compelled actor.

105

PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1980).

108

Id. at 86-88.
Id. at 87.
Turner, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).

109

Id. at 655.

106
107
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The importance of Pruneyard and Turner is that they stand for the
proposition that there may be a First Amendment violation under the
compelled speech doctrine even when no speech is compelled. In both
Pruneyard and Turner, neither the shopping center nor cable TV
operators were compelled to speak."o Instead, at issue was whether their
carriage of others messages would be viewed as the functional equivalent
of them speaking."' Under such a framework, as long as there is
sufficient association that the message the actor is compelled to carry is
thought to be the actor's own message, then there may be a First
Amendment violation.
In this case, the FBI's use of the AP's name may be addressed under
the compelled speech doctrine, irrespective of the fact that the FBI did
not compel the AP to say or publish anything. Rather, the mere fact that
the FBI uses the AP's name, and the resulting misattribution of the
speech, is enough. Consider if the pamphleteers in Pruneyard were
wearing Pruneyard's uniforms without Pruneyard's knowledge or
approval. In such a case, the public would understandably think that
Pruneyard was in fact against the U.N. resolution because of the
misattribution of the pamphleteers' speech. Although Pruneyard would
not have said anything, nor would it have been compelled to say
anything, it seems unlikely the Supreme Court would have let stand such
a practice on constitutional grounds. In this respect, misappropriated
speech is indistinguishable from compelled speech. Just as it is difficult
to tell the difference between speech that is compelled and speech that is
voluntary, it is also difficult to tell if one is speaking his own words or
merely acting as the vehicle through which another person's thoughts are
pronounced though. As a result, both compelled speech and
misappropriated speech cause the misattribution of speech.
Under this framework, the instant case may present more of an issue
than typical compelled speech cases. First, in cases where the State has
been allowed to compel the speech or force the access to private parties,
it has been justified and upheld on the grounds of truth or factual
disclosure.1 2 In other words, the compelled disclosure actually corrected
distortions in the marketplace of ideas or the marketplace of the
economy. Here however, the FBI's actions actually added distortion.
Add to this the fact that the Supreme Court has consistently held that lies
have no First Amendment value," 3 and the result is a decent argument
110 Pruneyard,447 U.S. at 88; Turner, 512 U.S. at 647.
.. Prunyard, 447 U.S. at 85-87; Turner, 512 U.S. at 653.
112
See, e.g., Zaunderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of

Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
113 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) ("False statements of fact
are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the
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that the FBI's actions were problematic. Moreover, even though the
Supreme Court has held that untruthful information lacks First
Amendment protections, the Court has often permitted its dissemination
because of the fear of chilling protected speech.1 4 Here, this justification
for allowing untruthful speech is not available.
If the compelled speech framework is applicable, then the FBI's
actions may well be unconstitutional. Crucial to the analysis is the extent
and pervasiveness of the practice. The publication and misattribution of a
single fake AP article likely would not raise concerns given that this
would only be a de minimis violation of the AP's right to not speak
effectively. However, a large scale practice of distributing fake AP
articles to the extent that there is widespread confusion over which AP
articles are genuine would likely violate the AP's right to not speak.
B. Indirect Interference with ProtectedActivities
Supreme Court cases have recognized the potential for a First
Amendment violation for government actions that stop short of directly
prohibiting or acting upon protected activities. These cases, which in
essence hold that the government's indirect interference with a protected
activity is actionable, are potentially applicable to the case at hand on the
basis that the FBI's actions amounted to such indirect interference. 115
This section examines the applicability of the "chilled" and "diluted"
speech doctrines in turn.

1. Chilled Speech
The incidental suppressive effects of direct government actions have
long been part of First Amendment jurisprudence.116 However, it was not
until Laird v. Tatum that a group sought to make out a First Amendment
violation on the basis of indirect effects alone. 117 At issue in Tatum was
the U.S. Army's surveillance of allegedly lawful and peaceful civilian
political activity."' This surveillance, as the Respondents argued, was
marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot
easily be repaired by counter-speech, however persuasive or effective"); Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) ("There is 'no constitutional value in
false statements of fact"').
114
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("Although the erroneous
statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in
free debate . . . punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive
exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press.").
115
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 6-14 (1972).
116
See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1985).
1
Tatum, 408 U.S.at 1.
118

Id. at 2.
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unconstitutional because it "chilled" their exercise of protected First
Amendment activities, even though the Army in no way directly
interfered with such activities.19 As a result, Tatum recognized that a
deterrent or chilling effect "of governmental efforts that fall short of a
direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights" may
nonetheless result in a First Amendment violation.1 20 The Court,
however, held that there was no cognizable injury in the actual case.121
Nonetheless, lower courts in the aftermath of Tatum have jumped on
this "indirect effects" cause of action, distinguished Tatum, and held that
various indirect government activities have indeed amounted to a First
Amendment injury. For instance, in Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld,
a political organization alleged that the U.S. Army, among other things,
covertly infiltrated their meetings, spread discord and disharmony, and
disseminated harmful files about their members.1 2 2 The Court
distinguished Tatum and held the suit as justiciable because the result of
the Army's actions was the "termination or restriction of employment
opportunities, unfair military trials, or damaged reputations" of members
of the groups.123
Likewise, in Handschu v. Special Services Division, the court held as
justiciable various political action groups' claims that the New York City
Police Department's Security and Investigation Section (SIS) chilled
their free speech and association rights.1 2 4 In Handschu, the groups
alleged, that SIS agents infiltrated their organizations and spread discord
and disharmony.1 2 5 This discord and disharmony so affected the
performance of the organizations that one group "disbanded [because of
the] atmosphere among its members of mistrust, suspicion and hostility"
which was created by the SIS.1 2 6
Finally, in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, the court
held that the infiltration of political organizations by undercover officers
of the Chicago Police Department chilled the speech of these
organizations. 127 In the case, undercover officers pretended they were
interested members and one officer eventually ascended to the board of
one organization, becoming their treasurer.1 28 That officer then spread
119
120

Id. at 10.
Board of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674

(1996) (quoting Tatum, 408 U.S. at 11).
121
Tatum, 408 U.S. at 13-14.
122

Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 147-48 (D.D.C. 1976).

123

Id. at 149-50.

124
125

Handschu v. Special Services Division, 349 F. Supp. 766, 768 (S.D.N.Y 1972).
Id.

126

Id. at 770.

127

All. to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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Id. at 1051-52.

2015-16]

STEALING PRESS CREDENTIALS

49

false information about the organization, which effectively destroyed the
group's reputation and nullified their message.1 2 9
These three cases suggest that notwithstanding Tatum, it is possible
to make out a First Amendment violation on the basis of the mere effects
of a government action even if the government action did not directly
prohibit the protected activity. Indeed, these cases show that as long as
there is sufficient injury, government actions that chill or interfere with
protected activities are actionable. The AP has stated that the FBI's
creation of a false AP story could have damaged its reputation and
affected its credibility. 30 As such, under the chilled speech doctrine, if
the FBI's activities so undermined the organizational capabilities of the
AP to the extent that it was no longer a trusted wire service or perceived
to be a mere conduit through which false government-created articles
would flow, then it could be argued that the AP's First Amendment
rights were effectively chilled.
Of course, there is the issue of the magnitude of the chill needed. As
Tatum held, not any chill is a cognizable injury.131 Berlin Democratic
Club, Handschu, and Alliance to End Repression demonstrate, however,
that when the chill rises to a certain threshold, such as the loss of
employment or the disbanding of an entire organization, then such a chill
may be cognizable. The Timberline episode falls short of such a level
and as mentioned above, it is highly unlikely that the FBI or any law
enforcement agency would misappropriate the press' identity to the
extent needed for a constitutional violation under the chilling doctrine.
Moreover, such a systematic practice, if put in place, would likely violate
internal government guidelines.1 3 2 But the doctrine does nonetheless
suggest that a widespread and consistent practice of creating and
disseminating fake AP articles, to the extent that the AP's very ability to
function is impaired, may be a First Amendment violation.

2. Diluted Speech
The diluted speech doctrine is closely related to the chilled speech
doctrine. The basic theory is that actions that dilute speech can infringe
on the First Amendment. Perhaps the easiest application and
visualization of this doctrine is in the trademark context. As mentioned
above, two causes of action exist under the Lanham Act for dilution.
Thus, courts have concluded that while the use of a mark for an
expressive purpose, such as commentary, comedy, parody, news
129
130

Id. at 1047.
See AP, supra note 14.

131

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972).

132

See supra Part I. A.
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reporting or criticism, is protected speech, the use of a mark to identify
the source of a message is not protected and is subject to the Lanham
Act.' 33 The justification for this contrast is that the First Amendment
"protects an individual's right to speak out ... but it does not permit an
individual to suggest that the markholder is the one speaking."1 3 4
However, there are several issues with applying the trademark
dilution doctrine to the expressive speech context. First, the Lanham
Act's theory of dilution is limited to the dilution of commercial value as
opposed to the value of protected First Amendment activities. 3 5 That is
to say, what is diluted in trademark cases is not speech, but the
commercial and monetary value associated with a particular trademark.
But there are instances of this dilution rationale being used to protect
more than just mere commercial value. For instance, in People v. Golb, a
New York Supreme Court case, the defendant used emails to
impersonate actual persons and was subsequently prosecuted under a
state law that criminalized such impersonation. 16 The defendant, the son
of an expert on the Dead Sea Scrolls, set up email accounts in which he
pretended to be several scholars who disagreed with his father's opinion
on the origin of the Scrolls. 17 Among other things, the defendant sent
emails in which he misappropriated the identity of one of these scholars
and purportedly "admitted" to acts of plagiarism.' 3 8
The court
determined that the fake emails damaged the careers and livelihoods of
the impersonated scholars and, in relying on various trademark cases,
held that the "First Amendment protects the right to criticize another
person, but it does not permit anyone to give an intentionally false
impression that the source of the message is that other person."1 39
Another issue with trademark law's dilution theory is that it is
grounded in statutory law, that is, the Lanham Act. But in this case, since
there is no applicable statute that the AP can rely on, the AP must prove
the dilution rationale as a matter of constitutional law. However, the
Supreme Court may have already started to constitutionalize the dilution
rationale, thus making it at least plausible for the AP to argue that the
FBI's actions diluted their speech in a manner that offended the First
Amendment.
SMJ Grp. v. 417 Lafayette Rest., 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id.
135 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (the Lanham Act is directed at the "sale [or] offering for sale"
of products with like marks, clearly indicating that the Lanham Act is meant to protect
against the dilution of commercial value).
136
People v. Golb, 991 N.Y.3d 455, 458-59. (2014).
137
Id. at 459.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 471.
133

134
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The best example of this phenomenon is a combination reading of
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Alvarez 40 and Arizona
Free EnterpriseClub's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.141 In Alvarez, the
Court addressed the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act (SVA).1 42
Under the SVA, "[w]hoever falsely represents himself or herself,
verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal
authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States ...
shall be fined [], imprisoned not more than six months, or both."1 4 3
Xavier Alvarez held himself out as a retired Marine who was
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor and was subsequently
prosecuted under the SVA.1 4 4 However, Alvarez did not make the
statements to secure financial benefits or other privileges, nor did the
SVA require such for prosecution.1 45 Indeed, the government defended
the statute on the grounds that it was necessary to "preserve the integrity
and purpose of the Medal [of Honor], integrity and purpose [that is]
compromised and frustrated by the false statements the statute
prohibits."1 4 6 As a result, the government made the argument that "false
representations have the tendency to dilute the value and meaning of
military awards;" a quintessential dilution rationale.1 47
In a deeply fractured opinion, a majority of the Supreme Court struck
down the statute, but no rationale gained more than a plurality of the
justices. But in neither Justice Kennedy's four-justice plurality opinion,
nor Justice Breyer's two-justice concurring opinion, was the dilution
rationale rejected. Justice Kennedy rejected the government's dilution
argument simply on the grounds that the government articulated
preservation of the integrity of military medals as a compelling interest
but "point[ed] to no evidence to support its claim that the public's
general perception of military awards is diluted by false claims such as
those made by Alvarez."1 48 As such, Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion
implicitly seemed to accept that the dilution of "the high purpose of the
award, [] the honor it confirms, and ... the appearance that the Medal is
awarded [rarely]" could be a possible justification in a better case.149
Justice Breyer's two-justice concurring opinion is even more
interesting. Justice Breyer specifically notes that trademark statutes are
140
141
142
143

144
145
146
147
148
149

United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
See Alvarez, 132 U.S. 2537.
Id. at 2543.
Id. at 2542.
Id. at 2542 and 2547.
Id. at 2543.
Id. at 2549.
Id.
Id.

52

U. MIAMI NAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV

[Vol. VI:25

the "closest analogy" to the present statute, but acknowledges that the
former focuses "upon commercial and promotional activities that are
likely to dilute the value of a mark.",5 0 However, Justice Breyer goes on
to explain that
Like both the plurality and the dissent, I believe the
statute nonetheless has substantial justification . ..The
statute serves this interest by seeking to preserve intact
the country's recognition of that sacrifice in the form of
military honors. To permit those who have not earned
those honors to claim otherwise dilutes the value of the
awards. Indeed, the Nation cannot fully honor those who
have sacrificed so much for their country's honor unless
those who claim to have received its military awards tell
'

the truth.' 5

As such, Justice Breyer merely struck down the statute on the basis
that the compelling interest in the preservation of the value of military
medals could be achieved in less burdensome ways.
As a result, Alvarez is useful analytically to the case at hand in
several ways. First, it suggests, like People v. Golb, that dilution is not
limited to merely the commercial dilution doctrine. Rather, intangible
things such as the perceived honor of awards can be diluted. Hence, ifas Justice Breyer notes-all nine justices agree that the "integrity" of
military medals can be diluted, and the preservation of their value is a
significant government interest, then surely the speech of the press can
be diluted in constitutionally significantly ways.1 52
Second, the issue in Alvarez can be reframed as a matter of
expression. Just like how bumper stickers on a car, 15 Mottos on a license
plate,154 or messages written on a t-shirt 5' 5 are matters of free speech
protected by the First Amendment, so too is the wearing of badges or
medals on a uniform. Medals, like flags or other symbols, convey a
message to the public; wearing medals is speech. In the Alvarez case,
medals conveyed the message that the wearer of the medal has
undergone extreme experiences, demonstrated exceptional bravery,
valor, and honor. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Alvarez
acknowledges that the purpose of military medals is for expressing
15o
151
152
153
154
155

Id. at 2554 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2555.
Id.
See Baker v. Glover, 776 F. Supp. 1511, 1512 (D. Alaska 1991).
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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"public recognition of valor and noble sacrifices."1 56 Thus, what the
Stolen Valor Act was really concerned with was the dilution of the
message that is conveyed whenever a person wears such a medal; that is
to say, the dilution of speech. 57
' As a result, Alvarez implied that it was
possible for this speech-the wearing of a medal- to be so damaged and
diluted, that it would potentially justify intervention by a federal statute
that burdened other speech.
Of course, as mentioned above, the critical issue here is that unlike in
Alvarez there is no statute that criminalized what the FBI did in
Timberline.

However,

Arizona Free Enterprise, when

read

in

conjunction with Alvarez, suggests that this dilution rationale appears to
have traction in the constitutional realm. As Justice Kennedy explains in
Alvarez, the dilution effect caused by people undeservingly wearing
medals comes from the "appearance that the Medal is awarded more
often than is true" and that "pretenders" that wear the medal "tarnish" the
quality of both the medals and those who wear them.5 s Thus, the dilution
effect in Alvarez is caused by two factors: first, the generation of excess
medal wearers interferes with the message of existing, legitimate, medal
wearers, and second, the fact that undeserving pretenders wear the
medals reduces the overall quality of the medals. Much is the same in the
instant case. The FBI's production of excess AP articles interferes with
the messages of existing, legitimate AP articles, and the production of
false articles "tarnishes" the overall quality of the AP wire service.
The first cause for dilution-the generation of excess articles-has
been found by the Supreme Court to be constitutionally problematic in
Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett. 159 At issue in Arizona Free

Enterprisewas the matching funds provision of Arizona's Citizens Clean
Elections Act. The matching funds provision provided public funds for
candidates running for political office whose opponents' privately raised
campaign funds exceeded a certain threshold.1 60 In this fashion, Arizona
sought to reduce the monetary gap between candidates who were and
who were not able to raise substantial funds from private sources.16' The
United States as amicus argued that the Arizona law did not burden the
speech of candidates not receiving public funds (that is, candidates who
were successful in fundraising money from private sources) because the
Alvarez, 132 U.S. at 2548.
Id. at 2549 (characterizing the compelling interest at stake as the "meaning of
military medals").
158
Id. at 2549.
159
See Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S.Ct.
2806,
2824 (2011).
160
Id. at 2813-16.
156
157

161

See id.
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law in no way prevented, prohibited, or interfered with the speech of
those candidates.1 6 2 However, the Court struck down the provision as in
fact burdening the speech of those candidates, explaining that:
Of course it [burdens speech]. One does not have to
subscribe to the view that electoral debate is zero sum to
see the flaws in the United States' perspective. All else
being equal, an advertisement supporting the election of
a candidate that goes without a response is often more
effective than an advertisement that is directly
controverted. And even if the publicly funded candidate
decides to use his new money to address a different issue
altogether, the end goal of that spending is to claim
electoral victory over the opponent that triggered the
additional state funding.1

63

In essence, Arizona Free Enterprise acknowledged that speech can
dilute, and therefore burden, other speech as a constitutional matter. To
make this clear, the Court struck down a law that would otherwise have
generated more "speech" on the grounds that this new publicly funded
speech would dilute existing privately funded speech. And since there is
no statute criminalizing the production of this excess speech-indeed the
statute at issue actually forced the production of speech-the Court relied
on the dilution rationale in striking down the statute under the First
Amendment.
As a result, the FBI's generation of "speech"-the fake AP articlescould be seen as constitutionally diluting and burdening the AP's
existing speech-the genuine articles produced by the AP, and thus
illegal even in the absence of a statute. To be sure, the fake AP articles
produced by the FBI would likely not be completely contradictory or
opposed to whatever the AP actually publishes. However, Arizona Free
Enterprise did not limit its holding that speech burdens other speech to
only circumstances where two instances of speech are in perfect conflict;
rather, the case stands for the general principle that the effectiveness of
speech can be reduced by additional speech.1 64 Therefore, the
effectiveness of the AP's existing speech-which is based entirely on the
timely presentation of accurate and truthful information-is clearly
diminished by speech that is not truthful and indeed, entirely fabricated.
See Id. at 2824.
Id.
164
Id. at 2824 ("[E]ven if the publicly funded candidate decides to use his new money
to address a different issue altogether, the end goal of that spending is to claim electoral
victory.").
162
163
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As such, under the dilution doctrine, the issue is not whether the
FBI's publication of fake AP articles dilutes or decreases the
effectiveness of the AP's message, but rather, to what degree the AP's
speech is sufficiently diluted and degraded to constitute a constitutional
violation. For this question, it should not be controversial to say that the
creation of a single, fake AP article, as was the case in Timberline, is not
of sufficient magnitude. Not every incidental burdening of the press is a
First Amendment violation.1 65 Moreover, the United States in Alvarez
conceded that "an isolated misrepresentation by itself would not tarnish
the meaning of military honors."1 66 Hence, in order for there to be any
sort of arguable dilutive effect, the AP would likely have to point to a
policy of publishing and disseminating fake articles greater than the lone
isolated occurrence in Timberline. But it is unclear what exactly the
tipping point is. Though Arizona Free Enterprise suggests that any
additional speech burdens or dilutes existing speech, it is unclear whether
the Court would abide by the logic of Arizona Free Enterprise when a
matter of security is offered by the FBI as the countervailing interest.
Perhaps what is more problematic for the AP is the availability of
counter speech. As was made clear in Alvarez, "the remedy for speech
that is false is speech that is true," and who better to provide counter
speech than a member of the press? 167 Indeed, the fact that the revelation
of the FBI's actions caused a tremendous uproar and resulted in
numerous press and media organizations denouncing the FBI's actions
seems to suggest that the press is especially capable of defending itself
against any dilutive effects fake articles may pose.
But, nonetheless, Alvarez and Arizona Free Enterprise do suggest

that as a constitutional matter, speech can degrade other speech and
therefore the act of publishing false AP articles, even if not at the level of
causing a constitutional violation, is at least constitutionally significant.
Given the internal guidelines mentioned in Part II, which implores the
FBI to take into account possible constitutional and other legal
considerations, 16 it may be advisable for law enforcement agencies to
refrain from such practices given the practical risks. For instance, if the
AP decided to pursue claims against the FBI, it would seem likely that in
the court of public opinion the FBI would lose decisively.1 6 9 For this
reason alone, the FBI may wish to refrain from using any tactics that may
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972).
United States v. Alvarez, 132 U.S. 2537, 2549 (2012).
167
Id. at 2550.
168
See Ashcroft, supra note 17, at 3 (noting that the FBI must consider the "risk of
invasion of privacy or interference with privileged or confidential relationships and any
potential constitutional concerns or other legal concerns.").
169 See e.g., Nakashima, supra note 13.
16

166
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have even an inkling of legal infirmity. This is especially the case if the
tactic concerns the press, which, as mentioned above, has the tools to
defend themselves, and given their position in American society, the
tools to shape the public discourse in ways unfavorable to the FBI and
government.
C. The Right to Receive Information
The last area of potential First Amendment applicability deals not
with the First Amendment protections of the AP or the press generally,
but rather, the First Amendment rights of ordinary Americans who read,
watch, or listen to the press. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has
held the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and press are
speaker's rights in the sense that it protects the right of speakers to speak
and the press to publish.1 70 However, a thread of First Amendment case
law has suggested that the First Amendment is more about the right of
the people to receive information than for protecting those who are
speaking.' 7 ' This latter theory thus creates the "First Amendment right to
receive information and ideas." 72 Under such a theory, the "guarantees
[of the First Amendment] are not for the benefit of the press so much as
for the benefit of all of us."1 73
Perhaps the clearest illustration of such a right to receive information
is Lamont v. Postmaster General of U.S.1

74

At issue in Lamont was a

statute that required the postal service to detain, and eventually destroy,
unsealed mail sent from foreign countries that was deemed to be
communist political propaganda, unless the addressee returned a reply
card indicating his desire to receive the mail.17 5 The Court struck down
the statute as unconstitutional, but crucially held that it was an
unconstitutional abridgement of the First Amendment right of addressees
to receive mail.1 7 6 In so holding, the Court necessarily realized a First
Amendment right to receive certain types of speech. On the basis of

See, e.g., United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
(The First Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many
this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.").
171
Robert Post, The ConstitutionalStatus of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1,
170

13 (2000).
172
173
174

175

See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).

Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).

Lamont v. Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).

Id. at 302.

Id. at 307 ("We rest on the narrow ground that the addressee in order to receive his
mail must request in writing that it be delivered. This amounts in our judgment to an
unconstitutional abridgment of the addressee's First Amendment rights.").
176
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Lamont alone then, the FBI's creation of false AP articles could be
viewed as infringing on the rights of the public to receive speech.
Of course, a critical difference is that the FBI, unlike the postal
service in Lamont, did not directly prohibit or interfere with the right to
receive actual AP articles. Nonetheless, if the dilution argument above is
adopted, then the FBI's actions may be viewed as burdening the public's
right to receive speech if the FBI published and disseminated a large
number of fake AP articles. To put it another way, the statute at issue in
Lamont did not prevent or prohibit the receipt of mail, but merely
burdened that right with the added requirement that the receiver send a
reply card. Similarly, in this case, the burden occurs when the FBI
creates many false AP articles, making it difficult for recipients to
receive actual AP articles.
Under an alternative analysis of the right to receive information, the
FBI's policy may also be potentially problematic, assuming again, that
the policy was carried out on a large-scale basis. The underpinning of the
"right to receive information" view of the First Amendment is the belief
that the First Amendment is meant to ensure an informed and educated
electorate capable of participating in democracy. 7 7 There are two
versions of this belief. The first is the view that the press functions as a
political check on govermment power, thereby allowing the public to not
only be aware of governmental misconduct, but also, to be able to
respond through political reprisal. 78 Justice Stewart is perhaps the most
famous purveyor of this view, arguing in his famous Yale address that
the purpose of the press and media freedoms was to allow the press to
function as a "Fourth Estate" in checking government power.179
Given that the press has been viewed by many as the defender of
truth or the inspector general tasked with checking all three branches of
government, it seems particularly egregious that the FBI would
177

See Genevra Kay Loveland, Newsgathering: Second-Class Right Among First
Amendment Freedoms, 53 TEX. L. REv. 1440, 1443 (1975).
178
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) ("The press plays a unique role as a
check on government abuse. . . "); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (The
press 'has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs,
exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the
citizenry of public events and occurrences[']); see also Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (The newspapers, magazines, and other journals of the country, it is
safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs
of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public
opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than
with grave concern).
179
Address at Yale University (Nov. 2, 1974), in "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J.

631, 632 (1975).
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misappropriate the identity of those assigned to check it. Indeed, if the
right to receive information is premised on the fact that information
about the government is needed via the independent press so that the
public can make intelligent and informed decisions, then any interference
with the press's delivery of such information may be a constitutional
violation.
The second and related view is that the dissemination of information
is necessary as part of democratic self-governance. The need for an
"open society," "an informed citizenry," or "personal self-fulfillment," is
necessary to make correct choices. 180 This so called search for truth in
the marketplace for ideas's' is the "right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters," 8 2 and is especially apparent in the
commercial context where correct and accurate information is necessary
for making the right economic choices.' 83
Consider the commercial speech context where the Supreme Court
has in some instances allowed compelled speech statutes to stand. The
type of statute that is often at issue in these cases is a statute that compels
a commercial entity to provide various factual disclosures. The
justification offered in all of these cases is that the compelled disclosure
of factual information meant to either correct or prevent the
dissemination of "commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or
misleading," is needed because the decisions that consumers make must
be intelligent and well informed.18 4
Indeed, the clearest formulation of this rationale appears in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
where the court struck down a statute that banned the advertisement of
prescription drug prices. 185 In the case, there was no claim that
advertised prices were misleading or deceptive, but rather, that the
180 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting)("In keeping with this
tradition, we have held that the right to publish is central to the First Amendment and
basic to the existence of constitutional democracy.").
1s1 See e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982); Widmarv. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.

290, 295 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537,
538 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1975); Bigelow v.

Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 248 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1966).
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Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.

748, 763-65 (1976).
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Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,

638 (1985).
15 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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advertisements tarnished the professionalism of the licensed
pharmacist. 8 6 The Supreme Court struck down the statute on the grounds
that the statute interfered with the public's right to know certain
information. As Justice Blackmun explained:
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow
of commercial information, that interest may be as keen,
if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most
urgent political debate.

. .

. Generalizing, society also

may have a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial
information.
Even
an
individual
advertisement, though entirely "commercial," may be of
general

public

interest . . .

however

tasteless

and

excessive it sometimes may seem, [advertising] is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and
at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly
free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources
in large measure will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that
those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial
information

is

indispensable . . .

And

if

it

is

indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a
free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the
formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system
ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the
First Amendment were thought to be primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of
information does not serve that goal.s7
Virginia State Board therefore adopts the viewpoint that consumers
have, at the very least, a "keen" interest in knowing certain pieces of
information-in this case, the price of prescription drugs-in order to
make, in the aggregate, intelligent economic choices in a free market
economy.
But perhaps more relevant is the first part of the quote of
Justice Blackmun's explanation where he acknowledges that this same
rationale applies in the political context. Hence, extrapolating Virginia
State Boardto the case at hand, several things can be said.
186

Id. at 766, 771-72.

187

Id. at 763-65 (emphasis added).
Id.
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First, the democratic society we live in can be viewed as having a
keen interest in the receipt of certain types of truthful and accurate
information so that the populace can make smart, intelligent, and
informed political decisions. Just as in Virginia State Board, where the
Court struck down a policy that interfered with the flow of commercial
information necessary to make an informed commercial decision, the
FBI's policy of misappropriating press credentials and disseminating
false news articles jeopardizes the ability of the populace to be informed
and make smart political or governance decisions. In other words, if the
First Amendment is viewed as protecting the right to receive
information, and the information the public has the right to receive is
information necessary for the public to be informed and for the public to
use for matters of politics and governance, then government policies that
impair the ability of the public to receive such information may be
treated as a constitutional infringement of the First Amendment.
Second, as discussed under the compelled speech section, there is
even less justification for the FBI's tactic given that the tactic actively
distorts the marketplace and creates deception and confusion. As such,
regardless of which view of the right to receive information is adopted,
the theory that the First Amendment protects the right to receive
information therefore centers on whether or not the public received the
information necessary for the public to exercise its discretion. Thus, this
theory places a premium on the dissemination of truthful information by
the press. Given that the FBI's tactic would do the exact opposite by
providing the public with misinformation, which may lead to incorrect
choices based on this incorrect information, it seems that the FBI's tactic
may well be constitutionally problematic at a theoretical level.
Of course, the practical implications of the FBI's misappropriation of
the AP's identity are likely to be zero. In order for any of these theories
to come into play, the FBI's policy would have to have been carried out
on a large scale. The isolated, sporadic, and sparing use of this technique,
though likely to anger many, is far from a constitutional violation as it
would not infringe, to any tangible degree, on the public's receipt of
truthful information. Indeed, given that in this particular case the article
was not even viewed by any person except the bomb suspect, there
would have been no ill effects on the public's right to receive
information.

V.

CONCLUSION

The FBI's misappropriation of the AP's identity is a novel variation
of law enforcement subterfuge. This has raised concerns that in the
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course of the FBI solving crimes, it has stepped on the constitutional
rights of the media. However, this single, isolated event is unlikely to
raise constitutional concerns. Until the FBI engages in a systematic and
consistent practice of misappropriating the identity of the press, First
Amendment legal concerns are unlikely to arise. Nonetheless, important
questions have been raised about the propriety of such tactics and
whether they are ever appropriate.

